

## 亚信 25 年：回顾与展望

（题记：本报告最初为上海国际问题研究院撰写的课题报告，后被论坛组委会选定作为亚信非政府论坛的参考文件，向所有与会代表公开散发。本课题组组长由上海国际问题研究院院长陈东晓担任，报告中文版为上海国研院战略研究所封帅执笔，上海国研院院长助理叶青统稿，报告英文版为上海国研院杨立翻译。本网站授权全文发布本报告。）

亚洲相互协作与信任措施会议（以下简称“亚信会议”）创立于 1992 年，经历 25 年的曲折发展，现已成为亚洲地区安全问题的重要对话与磋商论坛。在当前复杂的地区安全环境中，亚信会议通过多边互信及协调合作机制的创建，为维护亚洲地区的和平、安全与稳定做出了重要贡献。为了应对不断变化的社会经济基础和域内众多热点安全议题的挑战，亚信会议需要对未来的发展目标以及机制建设进行更加细致的规划。

### 一、亚洲安全形势的挑战

冷战结束后，亚洲安全形势日趋复杂，传统安全威胁仍未得到有效管控，在阿富汗、叙利亚、伊拉克、也门和朝鲜半岛，军事紧张局势仍在延续并有愈演愈烈之势。同时，恐怖主义、极端主义、流行性疾病、难民潮、毒品贸易，水和粮食安全等非传统安全威胁也在不断升级，并对地区人民的生命和财产安全构成了重大威胁。美国在亚太地区推动“再平衡”战略之后，亚太地区进入了大国之间的力量重新排列组合的调整期，美国、中国、日本、印度和俄罗斯等全球和地区大国都深深卷入其中。叙利亚战火延绵数年，反恐战争旷日持久，南海局势仍不明朗，萨德系统的部署又加剧了地区国家之间的紧张关系，安全形势的动荡已经构成了亚洲国家的共同威胁，对于全球安全形势也造成了严重影响。

虽然面临着共同的安全威胁和安全挑战，但由于各国在民族结构、宗教信仰、政治制度、历史文化以及地缘环境等方面存在着巨大差异，因此，亚洲国家不仅缺乏共同的亚洲身份认同，而且在具体的地区安全问题的认知与规划方面也存在

明显的差异。在不同安全理念的引导下，域内外大国推动了多项次区域安全机制的建设，尽管取得了一定成果，但各种安全机制叠床架屋，造成了战略资源的严重浪费。更因为各种机制之间存在明显的战略竞争关系，使得机制安排相互掣肘，直接阻碍了地区安全问题的解决。

因此，建立更具代表性和包容性的新的地区安全机制，并以此适应和协调各次区域安全机制，已经成为当前亚洲国家所面临的迫切任务。新的地区安全架构需要具有足够的灵活性，能够容纳绝大部分地区大国，并为其提供合理的战略空间，又需要有对主要地区安全问题加以管控，协调国家间分歧，并对亚洲安全未来做出长远规划。

## 二、亚信会议的发展历程与安全框架建设的尝试

1992年，哈萨克斯坦总统纳扎尔巴耶夫在联合国大会上首先提出了亚信会议的设想。1993年3月，在哈萨克斯坦的推动下，亚信会议第一次专家级和官员会晤在阿拉木图举行，开始就亚信会议的理念与机制安排进行沟通协调，从此拉开了亚信会议建设的序幕。1992-1999年，经过7年的对话和沟通，亚信第一次例行外长会议于1999年成功举行，并且通过了亚信会议的第一个基础性文件——《亚信成员国相互关系指导原则宣言》。2002年，首届亚信峰会在阿拉木图举行，会议通过了《阿拉木图文件》和《关于消除恐怖主义和促进文明对话的宣言》，构成了亚信会议最重要的纲领性文件。2004年，亚信会议第二届例行外长会议成功举办，通过了《亚信会议信任措施目录》和《亚信会议程序准则》，确定了成员国之间应该建立的互信措施清单。2006年，亚信会议在哈萨克斯坦设立秘书处，并在2010年第一次顺利实现主席国交接，土耳其成为亚信会议第二任主席国，标志着亚信会议机制化框架的基本确立。

2014年的亚信上海峰会是亚信发展史上的里程碑。中国担任亚信主席国后，认真履行职责，积极推进亚信进程，亚信会议进入了快速发展时期。

一方面，中国通过提出新的安全理念和扩大组织规模等方式提升亚信的国际影响力。在亚信上海峰会上，习近平主席提出了“共同、综合、合作、可持续”的亚洲安全观，得到了亚洲各国的普遍关注和认同。在新安全理念的吸引下，孟

加拉国和卡塔尔顺利升级为亚信成员国，白俄罗斯则成为新的亚信观察员。亚信会议的组织规模进一步扩大，理念倡议得到更广泛认同，其国际影响力达到了前所未有的高度。另一方面，中方积极推动亚信框架内多领域合作进程的拓展，将亚信内部合作做实做强。中国就任亚信主席国后，在亚信框架内先后创办了亚信青年委员会、亚信实业家委员会，举办了“亚信日”大型主题活动，在北京召开了亚信非政府论坛的首届年会，在上海举办了五届亚信国际智库圆桌会议，并且支持了亚信成员国在亚信框架内举办的多项培训与专家论坛活动，为区域内国家的安全对话与民间交流搭建了较为完整的沟通平台。

通过历任主席国的不懈努力，截止到 2016 年底，亚信会议已拥有 26 个成员国和 12 个观察员（包括国家和国际组织），并发展成为亚洲地区最具包容性的多边安全对话平台。作为泛亚洲安全论坛，亚信会议在核心理念与机制建设方面都具有独特的优势，能够在未来亚太安全体系中发挥更加重要的作用：

首先，亚信会议已经成为一个开放包容的多边安全机制。它不仅没有为成员国的加入设立门槛，反而尽可能多的邀请亚洲国家成为组织的成员国，并且邀请了很多深度介入地区安全事务的域内外国家作为观察员国参与亚信会议的活动。这赋予了亚信会议高度包容性和代表性。这一特性使得亚信会议能够最广泛地凝聚亚洲国家的安全共识，其所秉持的安全理念体现了当前亚洲各国的安全需求，并且能够为区域内各种安全问题提供有效的协商对话平台。

其次，亚信会议能够承载亚洲国家的安全诉求。很多亚洲国家对于新的地区安全体系建设都拥有各自观点，但多数现有安全机制兼容性有限，无法满足亚洲国家实现共同安全的愿望。作为亚洲覆盖范围最广的安全机制，亚信会议既包括中国，俄罗斯，印度等地区大国，也容纳了亚洲可以在安全议题上发挥积极作用的大部分中等国家。过去的 25 年中，多数亚信会议成员国都保持了经济增长的势头，国家能力显著提升，愿意为地区安全和稳定承担更多责任。在亚信会议的宏观框架内，各国拥有较大的协商空间，可以通过灵活的机制性安排共同承担地区安全的义务，共享安全利益，通过充分互动满足各国在本地区的安全期望，承载各国合理的安全诉求。

最后，亚信会议能够为未来亚洲安全架构提供基础框架。经过 25 年的不懈努力，特别是最近十年来的建设和发展，亚信会议已经初步建成了由亚信峰会、

亚信外长会议、亚信高官会及不同领域的协调对话机制所组成的完整机制网络，同时制定了关于其任务、愿景、运行机制和架构的基本文件，并与上海合作组织等本地区重要的国际组织签署了合作协议，当前亚信会议的机制建设不仅满足了地区安全协商的现实需要，也为今后的逐步升级发展铺平了道路，有条件为亚洲安全架构建设提供基础框架。利用现有机制，能够使亚洲安全架构建设少走很多弯路，实现事半功倍的效果。

当然，尽管亚信会议近年来获得了较大的发展，前景广阔。但毋庸讳言的是，迄今为止，亚信会议在亚洲安全体系中发挥的作用仍比较有限，其发展面临的困难与挑战是亚洲国家尚未形成共同的“亚洲意识”或者“亚洲认同”。亚洲安全环境在性质上非常复杂，而在具体的安全问题上往往又非常敏感。如果说欧洲各国是因为文化、历史与宗教上的相似而被视为一个统一的地理空间的话，那么亚洲则是一个被强大的西方话语人为建构的共同空间。事实上，在亚洲这块广袤的土地上，各国在地缘环境、民族构成、宗教信仰、意识形态、历史发展上千差万别，亚洲国家在历史上从未建构起共同的身份认同。在现代亚洲格局中，次区域空间仍是亚洲国家主要政治活动区域，碎片化仍是亚洲政治空间的基本特征。在这种情况下，亚洲则更多体现出一种地域上的概念，很难构成共同的身份认同。这是推进共同体面对的一大障碍。

### **三、亚信会议发展的前景展望**

经过 25 年的发展，亚信会议已经成为当前亚洲安全领域中的一个具有较大包容性和广泛性的安全对话机制平台。为了推动亚信会议的提升与发展，更好地满足成员国的安全期待，担任轮值主席的中国积极推动机制建设，兑现亚信峰会上的各项承诺，激发亚信会议的活力。先后创立和主办了亚信非政府论坛、亚信智库圆桌会议和亚信会议青年理事会等机制。这些活动的成功举办丰富了亚信框架内的安全合作内容，有助于扩大亚信会议的知名度与认可度。目前亚信会议对于亚洲安全议程的整体影响力仍有广泛的提升空间，要实现最初设计的建设目标还有很长的路要走。亚洲特殊的安全环境需要一个更活跃的亚信会议，而亚信会议也需要建立更加完善和有效的制度，使其在亚洲安全体系中的独特作用能够得

到最大限度的发挥。为了保持亚信会议良好的发展势头，应该注意加强以下几个方面的工作：

第一，在亚洲范围内培养命运共同体意识。亚洲地区共同意识和身份认同的缺失是影响亚洲安全机制推广的重要障碍，亚信会议需要为建立这样一种凝聚亚洲各国的命运共同体意识而努力。亚洲在地理、历史、宗教、文化等方面的分散性并非短时间内可以克服，但对于经济繁荣和地区稳定的追求是亚洲国家的共同愿望，基于和平和繁荣的共同理想可以成为凝聚亚洲各国的粘合剂。在亚信平台上，应着力增进命运共同体意识，利用卓有成效的文明对话与经贸合作，推动亚洲共同意识的形成。

第二，继续加强自身能力和制度结构的建设。当前，亚信会议在机制建设方面仍然存的不少短板和缺陷，直接制约了亚信会议的持续稳定发展。亚信会议秘书处和其他现有行政机构应当是经费稳定和人员充足的机构，应当赋予亚信会议秘书处督促“互信机制”落实的职权。亚信会议还需要增加工作会议和专家会议的频度，并设立更多高级别会议机制，比如国防部长会议、公安部长会议和其他涉及国内与国际安全议题的会议机制。为了提高成员国应对和解决亚洲安全问题的能力，亚信会议还需要充分利用各种制度安排建立一个多层次和多领域的网络。应该认真考虑建立地区分会和支点国家等意见，为了更好应对地区风险，亚信会议还应该尝试建立危机管理与处理机制。其最终目标是通过机制建设提升亚信会议在亚洲安全环境中的行动力和影响力，进而为新的安全架构建设奠定坚实的基础。

第三，充分考虑中小国家的地区安全愿景。亚信会议在推进完善的过程中，不仅应当关注大国的作用和责任，也应当充分考虑中小国家的愿景和舒适度。创立伊始，亚信会议就承载着维护亚洲中小国家稳定安全发展的使命，理想中的亚信会议是成为能促进中小国家最大程度发挥其比较优势的国际机制。亚洲中小国家对于地区安全有其特殊的诉求，他们在理念和机制建设方面的很多设想和创造力，能够为大国增强亚信会议影响力的努力而增益。因此，亚信应该充分发挥自己在聆听中小国家意见方面的优势，应当将各种不同的意见整合为共同的愿景，利用地区中小国家的创造力，为增强亚信会议框架创造合力。

最后，二轨对话机制在亚信会议发展过程中将发挥非常重要的作用。同所有

亚洲安全机制一样，亚信会议内部各成员国在亚信未来的发展目标与任务等方面，也存在各种分歧和争议。各成员国之间通过多种渠道进行充分的对话与沟通，对于亚信的发展甚为关键。因此，亚信会议应该积极开拓亚信框架内的二轨对话机制，将亚信发展方向、亚洲安全共识等重要问题首先在二轨层面进行讨论，凝聚共识，并且为亚信会议的发展提供意见与建议。各成员国的智库和研究机构因其多年来的学术积累，往往对于亚信会议所肩负的任务与责任的理解更为深刻，也能够为促进亚洲的和平与繁荣贡献更多的理念与研究成果。应充分发挥相关研究机构的建设性作用，推动亚信框架内的智库合作网络建设，并进一步加强与域外智库的合作，以促进亚洲范围内的安全合作进程。亚信会议应加强二轨对话机制建设，并且加强亚信秘书处与各种亚信二轨机制之间的合作关系，充分利用各国智库机构为亚信会议的发展提供智力支持。

### CICA at 25: Review and Outlook

First conceived in 1992 and after 25 years of evolution, CICA has become a major forum for dialogues and consultations on regional security issues. In an increasingly complicated security environment, CICA has a unique role to play in maintaining peace, security, and stability through multilateral confidence building and concerted cooperation. To cope with the changing socioeconomic foundations and multiple security hot-spots, CICA needs to calibrate its long-term objectives and make detailed plans for institution building.

#### I. Asian Security Challenges

Since the end of the Cold War, Asia's security environment has become increasingly complicated. In traditional security field, military tensions in some parts of Asia such as Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Korean Peninsula continue unabated. Meanwhile, multiple non-traditional security challenges, such as terrorism, extremism, pandemic diseases, massive flows of refugees, drug trafficking, and water/food security have kept escalating. In the wake of the U.S. rebalancing strategy, the Asia-Pacific region has entered a period of power realignment involving major

players, such as the United States, China, Japan, India, and Russia. Local conflicts and tensions flare up time and again: the ongoing civil war in Syria; the persistent anti-terror war in the Middle East; territorial disputes in the South China Sea; and tensions over THAAD development in South Korea. The intense situation not only presents a common threat to all Asian countries but also sends shock waves across the globe.

Although faced with the same common security threats, Asian countries have not developed a common Asian identity due to their significant differences in ethnic composition, religious belief, political system, cultural tradition, and geographical location. It is therefore, natural for the Asian countries to perceive and plan about various regional security issues differently. Lack of consensus among major Asian countries has resulted in divergent, inconsistent, and even conflicting strategies and approaches to address regional and sub-regional security issues. Such an environment will not only lead to waste of resources in building overlapping functions but also create new grounds for competition among regional countries.

Therefore, for Asian countries, it has become an urgent requirement to build a new security institution which should be more representative and inclusive in nature so as to accommodate and coordinate various sub-regional security mechanisms. This new security institution must be flexible and broad-based to provide sufficient strategic space for every stakeholder on the one hand, and capable of managing major security issues, bridging divides and settling disputes, and making long-term plans for Asian security on the other.

## II. CICA Evolution and Asian Security Architecture Building

The idea of convening CICA was first proposed by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, at the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 1992. In March 1993, the first meeting of experts and government officials were convened in Almaty under Kazakh sponsorship, beginning the discussion on CICA's guiding principles and operational mechanisms and setting in motion its evolution. After seven years of dialogues and communications from 1992 to 1999, the first meeting of CICA foreign ministers was held in 1999, adopting CICA's first founding document—Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between CICA Member

States. CICA's first summit meeting held in Almaty in 2002 adopted two important guidelines documents: Almaty Act and Declaration on Eliminating Terrorism and Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations. The second CICA meeting of foreign ministers in 2004 produced a CICA Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures and the first CICA Rules of Procedure, laying out a detailed list of confidence building measures for the member states. The establishment of the CICA Secretariat in Almaty in 2006 and the chairmanship handover from Kazakhstan to Turkey in 2010 ushered in a new period of CICA's institutionalization.

The year 2014 witnessed another milestone in CICA's evolution: the Shanghai Summit, at which China assumed CICA Chairmanship. Since then, China has fulfilled its commitment by putting the CICA process on a fast track.

China has expanded CICA's international influence by proposing a new security concept and enlarging CICA's membership. The new concept of "common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security" put forward by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Summit has won wide approval among Asian nations. Identifying themselves with the new security concept, Bangladesh and Qatar joined CICA as member states and Belarus was welcomed as an observer. With an expanded membership and a popular security concept, CICA's global relevance and impact has been expanded. Meanwhile, China has also strengthened CICA solidarity by expanding areas of cooperation within the CICA framework. For example, China helped to establish the CICA Youth Council and CICA Business Council and organized a series of events marking the CICA Day which was set on October 5. China has built a comprehensive platform for security dialogues and nongovernmental exchanges for the countries of the region by hosting the first annual meeting of the CICA Nongovernmental Forum in Beijing and five international roundtable meetings of CICA think tanks, and sponsoring multiple training programs and experts' workshops among CICA members states.

As a result of accumulative efforts of successive chairmanships, CICA has developed into the most inclusive multilateral forum for regional security dialogues with 26 member states and 12 observers (including international organizations). As the only pan-Asian security forum, CICA is unique in terms of its core ideas and institution-building capacity, and therefore well-positioned to play a larger role in the



Asia-Pacific security landscape.

To begin with, CICA is an open and inclusive multilateral security institution with no threshold for members' accession. It has spared no efforts to invite as many Asian countries to be member states as possible, and has also invited countries outside the region yet deeply involved in regional affairs to participate as observers. As such, the high level of inclusiveness and representativeness has enabled CICA to not only reflect the variety of security demands of regional players, but also build broad-based security consensus through substantive consultations and dialogues.

Besides, taking into account the diverse security perceptions and interests of regional countries, CICA is also capable of meeting their security expectations by overcoming the incompatibilities of various regional security mechanisms and creating a common vision of indivisible security. CICA includes not only major powers such as China, Russia, and India, but also most of the middle powers in the region capable of playing an active role in security issues. In the past 25 years, many CICA member states have experienced rapid economic growth and remarkable capacity buildup, enabling them to shoulder more responsibilities for regional peace and stability. Not only does the CICA framework provide ample space for wide consultation but also flexible arrangements for sharing security burdens and promoting a common security agenda with a view to living up to the reasonable security expectations of all stakeholders.

Last but not least, CICA has laid a solid foundation for a viable Asian security architecture. After 25 years of development, especially the last decade's fast evolution, CICA has grown into a full-fledged institutional network comprised of summit meeting, foreign ministers meeting, senior officials committee, and other mechanisms for consultation and dialogue. At the same time, CICA has formulated a number of basic documents laying out its mission, vision, operational mechanisms, and institutional structure. It has also signed memoranda of understanding with various regional and international organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Fully utilized, the existing mechanisms within the CICA framework will be the shortest path toward a robust Asian security architecture.

CICA's fast growth implies a bright outlook, yet it has to overcome a number of challenges before it could play a larger role in the Asian security landscape. Chief

among the challenges is lack of a common “Asian awareness” or “Asian identity.” Asia’s security environment is very complicated and sensitive in nature. While European countries share similar cultural and religious origins, Asia is more of a geographical concept imposed on the nations of the region by Western narrative. In such a vast land with striking distinctions and immense diversities in terms of geographical condition, ethnic composition, religious belief, and ideology as well as their historical development, the difficulties in evolving a common recognition of Asian entity will be tremendous, let alone the acceptance of a shared community of Asia. In the contemporary Asian landscape characterized by increasing fragmentation, sub-regions remain the premier arena of political interactions among all Asian countries.

### III. Outlook and Ways Forward

Over the past 25 years, CICA has developed into the most representative and inclusive pan-Asian institution in regional security field. To live up to the expectations of the CICA members, China as the rotating chair has stepped up its efforts to revitalize CICA by fulfilling many of its commitments made at the summit, including initiating and sponsoring the CICA nongovernmental forum, international roundtable meetings of CICA think tanks, and CICA Youth Council. All these activities are conducive to the promotion of CICA’s publicity and recognition both within and outside the Asian continent. However, CICA’s overall influence on Asia’s security agenda is still limited. There is yet a long way to go before CICA could fulfill its vision. Asia’s unique security environment demands a more active CICA, and CICA also needs more sound and effective institutions to maximize its role in Asia’s security system. To maintain CICA’s positive evolutionary momentum, greater efforts need to be made in the following aspects.

First, fostering a pan-Asian sense of shared destiny. The absence of a common Asian awareness or identity is what stands in the way of a robust pan-Asian security institution and CICA has a due role to play in helping Asian nations cultivate such an awareness. It takes time to bridge the existing religious, cultural, geographical, and historical differences, but Asian nations share a common aspiration for economic prosperity and regional stability, which could serve as a cohesive agent binding them

together. As a pan-Asian institution, CICA should promote an Asian awareness/identity based on the sense of shared destiny through substantive inter-civilizational dialogues and mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

Second, strengthening capacity and institution building. In this regard, CICA still has many deficiencies and shortcomings. CICA's Secretariat and other existing administrative bodies should be made financially stable and staffed with adequate personnel. The Secretariat should also be given the mandate to monitor the implementation of confidence building measures. CICA should also try to increase the frequency of working and experts meetings, and set up more high-level meetings, such as meetings of defense ministers, ministers of public security/the interior and other senior officials concerning issues related to domestic or international security. To promote member states' participation and CICA's capacity in addressing and resolving Asia's security issues, it also needs to make good use of various institutional arrangements to establish a network at multiple levels and fields. The establishment of regional chapters or pillars is also worth serious consideration. To better address regional risks, CICA may also need to build crisis-management and emergency-response mechanisms as a way of increasing its relevance to Asian security matters and laying a solid foundation for a new security architecture.

Third, accommodating small and medium-sized nations' security concerns. In the course of promoting its development and upgrading, CICA should not only pay attention to major countries' roles and responsibilities, but also make full use of small and medium-sized countries vision and innovation. CICA should be such an international institution that it is conducive to optimizing the comparative advantages of small and medium-sized countries, which are capable of supplementing major countries' efforts to enhancing CICA's influence with their unique visions and strengths. It is therefore important to develop divergent views into integrated visions which will create synergy and further strengthen CICA's framework.

Finally, giving Track II dialogue an institutionalized role in promoting CICA's evolution. Since CICA members have not reached an agreement on the direction and mission of CICA's development, it is essential to conduct comprehensive dialogues and communications through all channels available. In this regard, consultations and

discussions should first be carried out at the Track II level to build consensus and put forth practical recommendations. CICA members' think tanks have a deeper understanding of CICA's missions and responsibilities, and they should try to contribute more valuable ideas and research products aimed at enhancing Asia's peace and prosperity. It is also necessary to set up a network of think tank cooperation within the CICA framework to tap the expertise of think tanks on the one hand, and strengthen cooperation between think tanks inside and outside CICA on the other with a view to promoting the security cooperation process in Asia. Track II dialogue must be further institutionalized to promote cooperation between the CICA Secretariat and various Track II mechanisms and solicit more intellectual contributions from think tanks for the benefit of CICA evolution.